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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
As well as highlighting the importance of introducing counter cyclical capital buffers, this chapter 
draws attention to the need for greater focus on “more forward looking provisions”, as well as 
provisions which are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems attributed to “maturity 
transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans.” Whilst the need for forward looking 
provisioning has been echoed by some authorities on the literature, the chapter also adds weight 
to the argument through its attempt to link such an argument to the ever increasing prominence 
assumed by liquidity risks – since liquidity also contributes to pro cyclicality. 
 
 
“The complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions - which to a large 
extent, is attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage, has resulted in an increasingly important role for 
liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.” Owing to such increased 
importance of liquidity risks, this chapter also attempts to highlight why the Basel Committee’s 
Counter Cyclical Buffer Proposal – a response to the recent financial crisis (which to a significant 
extent, focuses on banking sector capital requirements), should also take greater account of more 
forward looking provisions. In so doing, it draws attention to the importance of coupling forward 
looking provisions (as well as other measures) with counter cyclical charges and why this provides 
a better alternative to the mere introduction of counter cyclical capital charges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Counter cyclical buffers, liquidity risks, pro cyclicality, capital, loan loss 
provisions, financial crises, bank, regulation 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Measures Aimed at Mitigating Pro Cyclical Effects of the Capital 
Requirements Framework: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposals 
 
Prof Marianne Ojo 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In its consultative document on “Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal” 2 the Basel Committee 
highlights the principal aim of the proposal, namely “ the implementation of buffers of capital to 
achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess 
aggregate credit growth which have been linked to the build up of system wide risk.” 3 A further 
benefit of the proposal which is attributed to the aim of protecting the banking sector from the credit 
cycle is its potential to assist in “leaning against the build-up phase” of the cycle in the first instance  
– this occurring (according to the Committee), through the capital buffer acting to raise the 
cost of credit – hence dampening and reducing its demand. 4 
 
This chapter aims to highlight reasons attributed to the importance of introducing counter cyclical 
capital buffers – the principal focus being the need to mitigate pro cyclical effects. In so doing it 
commences with an introduction on how such pro cyclical effects arise and why they need to be 
addressed. The chapter also illustrates that even though it is increasingly acknowledged that 
capital, on its own, cannot address system wide risks (owing to the growing importance and 
significance of liquidity risk), that current measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclical effects focus 
primarily on capital. Hence the need to introduce counter cyclical buffer proposals which are also 
linked to the redress of liquidity risks, also constitutes an objective which this chapter aims to 
address. Such need will be considered under the fourth section of this chapter which considers 
recommendations made by the Financial Stability Forum and which specifically (and importantly) 
includes bank loan loss provisions. Thus whilst progress with measures aimed at ensuring that 
banking systems are equipped with buffers of capital (to protect them against future losses) is very 
much appreciated, greater focus on other measures aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen 
problems attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans” 5 (which 
exposes banks to such vulnerabilities as liquidity risks) are required. 
 
One of the principles which were highlighted by the Basel Committee as constituting vital 
components of a “global financial stability framework” is namely, the principle that “All 
macroeconomic policies need to be counter cyclical, building up buffers in good times that can be 
 
 
 
  Email :marianneojo@hotmail.com, North West University final version submitted to publisher April 2016 
2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“ July 
2010  http://www.bis .org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 2. The Consultative Document interestingly highlights 
the fact that the Counter Cyclical Proposal is not a Pillar 2 approach – since “it does not relate to supervisor review of 
individual banks.” see ibid at page 12. Furthermore, the Consultative Document addresses the treatment of surplus when 
buffer returns to zero by indicating that “the Basel Committee’s working assumption is that the capital surplus created 
when the counter cyclical buffer is returned to zero, should be unfettered – that is, no restrictions should be imposed on 
distributions when the buffer is turned off.” See ibid at page 13  
3 Further, the Committee adds that since capital is more expensive than other forms of funding, the build up of 
defences (such as capital defences which are built up by banks during periods where “the risks of system-wide 
stress” are characterised by significant and marked levels of growth) may provide the additional benefit of helping 
to stabilise excessive credit growth levels during periods of economic and financial booms. See ibid. 
                                                          
 
4 See ibid at page 3  
5 See Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision September 2008 at page 1 (page 7 of 44)  
 
 
 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> 
 
run down in bad times. In particular, fiscal authorities need to reduce debt levels in good 
times in order to have the capacity to respond at times of stress. “ 6 
 
Whilst it is contended that monetary policies should be aimed at the control of inflation, 
fiscal policies are considered to have the role of “counter cyclical demand management.” 7 
 
Pro cyclicality 8  
 
Pro cyclicality is a term used to denote “ the self-reinforcing mechanisms within the financial 
system and between the financial system and the real economy that can exacerbate boom 
and bust cycles, undermining financial and macroeconomic stability. These effects are most 
prominent in the downward phase. As strains develop, previously unseen risks materialise, 
deepening the retrenchment that is already under way.” 9 Furthermore, it is not only contended 
that “the effects of pro cyclicality are critical (but hidden) in the expansion phase, when the 
underlying risks build up, but that historical experience reveals that credit mistakes are made 
during the boom phase but are revealed only during the bust.” 
 
An example of a “fundamental” source of pro cyclicality as provided by the Committee of 
the European Banking Supervisors(CEBS),  10 is attributed to “excessive risk-taking during 
periods of expansion, which results in the build up of vulnerabilities”. 
 
 
Some of the recommendations put forward and highlighted as means of addressing pro 
cyclicality include: 11  
- A policy response founded on the build up and run down of capital buffers in a 
counter cyclical fashion over the business cycle. These safety margins must be built 
up in good times, when it is easier and cheaper to do so. 12 Such a build-up will 
restrain risk-taking during the expansion phase of the business cycle. During 
periods of recession, these buffers can be run down, allowing the system to absorb 
emerging strains more easily and dampening the feedback mechanisms.  
 
- The importance of distinguishing between the regulatory minimum capital requirement and 
buffers operating above the minimum requirements. A breach of the regulatory minimum 
brings with it severe consequences, which could result in a bank being shut down. The  
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International 
Settlements Publications, page 2 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf> 
ibid at page 6. Furthermore, it is added that consideration should be given to “the need to maintain fiscal 
buffers that allow a response to financial system stress - which implies that government debt should be 
maintained at reasonably low levels in good times so that additional debt can be taken on in times of 
stress without unsettling financial markets.” See ibid at page 7 
Pro cyclicality is also the tendency for periods of financial/economic downturns or booms to be further exacerbated by 
certain economic policies. For further considerations on the possible consequences of according a  
high degree of prominence to certain economic objectives, see M Ojo, „Social Rights and Economic Objectives: The 
Importance of Competition at Supra National Level „ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651610 
See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 and 17 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>  
10 Furthermore, the CEBS defines pro cyclicality as comprising “mechanisms through which the financial 
system can amplify business fluctuations that are particularly disruptive during an economic downturn or 
when the financial system is faced with pressures.” See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 
“Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34   
11 H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 16 and 17 of 26  
12 ibid; also see Bank for International Settlements, “Addressing financial system procyclicality: a possible framework”,   
Note for the FSF Working Group on Market and Institutional Resilience, April 2009.  
buffers are intended to be built up in good times so that they can absorb losses 
without the bank becoming insolvent.” 
 
 
The Basel Committee has proposed building up these buffers through a combination of 
counter cyclical capital charges, forward-looking provisioning and capital conservation 
measures. 13 It is also recommended that other potential macro prudential instruments 
such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios should be explored. 
 
Jimenez and Saurina, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano are amongst several other academics 
who have put forward proposals aimed at addressing pro cyclical problems.  14 The proposal put 
forward by Jimenez and Saurina “focuses on an additional flow of loan loss provisions – in addition 
to specific and general provisions.” 15 Such a design is aimed at addressing the “future increase in 
credit risk deriving from too lenient credit standards during periods of economic booms.” 16 As 
observed by the CEBS, whilst a similar proposal (to that of Jimenez and Saurina) was also put 
forward by Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano, some reservations on the potential and efficiency 
of the present applicable principle for policy intervention (that is, conserving buffers in the system 
during periods of economic booms – for the purposes of “controlled” utilisation of such buffers 
during periods of economic pressures), were expressed by Kashyap, Rajan and Stein. 17 
 
The promotion of financial stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of 
Basel II’s primary objectives. 18 However some problems identified with Basel II are attributed to pro 
cyclicality and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the trading book are adequately accounted 
for in the current capital requirements. 19 The pro cyclical nature of Basel II has been criticised since 
“capital requirements for credit risk as a probability of default of an exposure decreases in the economic 
upswing and increases during the downturn” 20 – hence resulting 
 
13 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 16 of 26  http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector – consultative document, December 2009.   
14 For further information on this see Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a 
Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at page 34. “Studies which were included and reviewed in the 
Dynamic Operation Project (DOP) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – which 
addressed the issue of the cyclicality of Pillar One capital requirements include those of Goodhart, 
Hofmann and Segoviano along with Kashyap and Stein. The DOP report examined several academic 
papers that implemented simulation approaches to estimate the magnitude of the cyclical variations of 
Basel II requirement over the business cycle.” See ibid at page 33.   
15 See ibid at page 33  
16 “Given that the provision is positive during periods of economic booms, and negative during periods of recessions, 
it is argued that such a provision should have a counter cyclical impact on banks’ lending policies.” ibid  
17 It is acknowledged that “time-varying capital requirements represent a potentially important improvement over the 
current time invariant approach in Basel II because they allow some of the rainy day funds to be spent when it rains  
– thereby reducing the pressure on banks to liquidate assets (as well as associated negative spill overs for the rest of 
the economy. However, time varying capital requirements are also acknowledged to be problematic from a cost 
perspective” See ibid at page 36; see also Jimenez and Saurina , “Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential 
Regulation” (2006) International Journal of Central Banking, vol.2, no.2; Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano , “Bank 
Regulation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations” (2004) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20,no. 4; Kashyap, 
Rajan and Stein, “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
symposium on “Maintaining stability in a Changing Financial System”, Jackson Hole, August 2008.  
18 For further objectives, see , Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. <  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf > at page 22 of 47  
19 See ibid at page 23 of 47  
20 See Annex on Proc cyclicality, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies. <  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> at page 46 
of 47  
in capital requirements which fluctuate over the cycle. Other identified 21 consequential effects 
include the fact that fluctuations in such capital requirements may result in credit institutions raising 
their capital during periods when its is costly 22 for them to implement such a rise – which has the 
potential of inducing banks to cut back on their lending. It is concluded that “risk sensitive capital 
requirements should have pro cyclical effects principally on undercapitalised banks.” 23 
 
Regulators will be able to manage systemic risks to the financial system during such periods 
when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend where more market 
participants such as credit rating agencies, could be engaged in the supervisory process. The 
Annex to Pro cyclicality in the Accompanying Document amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive 24 not only importantly emphasises the fact that regulatory capital requirements do 
not constitute the sole determinants of how much capital banks should hold, but also highlights 
the role of credit rating agencies in compelling banks to increase their capital levels even 
where such institution may be complying with regulatory requirements. 
 
The fact that “adjustments (for individual institutions’ contributions to systemic risk) would 
actually exacerbate pro cyclicality, has been highlighted. 25 A second and further 
consequence of using “certain market based measures of systemic risk to address the 
time dimension” is that, “the measures would provide the wrong signal: Systemic risk 
would look low when, in fact, it was actually high.” 26 
 
 
Even though the implementation of higher levels of capital buffers could serve as a means for the 
management of systemic risks, liquidity requirements 27 have also been acknowledged by many as 
having a fundamental role to play in mitigating contagion – hence assuming a role which is similar to 
that of capital buffers. 28 The link between counter cyclical buffers, capital and liquidity standards is 
further demonstrated through the impact which is generated as a result of the implementation of capital 
and liquidity standards. Counter cyclical buffer schemes could serve as means of enhancing 
 
 
21 As identified in the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and 
remuneration policies. See page 46 of 47   
22 Liquidity, a topic which will be addressed in the next section, is also considered to be “highly pro cyclical, 
growing in good times and drying up in times of stress.” During the build up to the present crisis, banks and other 
financial institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity. See Report of the Financial Stability 
Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System “Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk” at page 24 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf 
 
23 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review 
December 2009 at page 150  
24 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies.<  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> See page 46 of 47   
25 See C Borio, “Implementing a Macro Prudential Framework : Blending Boldness and Realism” 
Bank for International Settlements Publications at page 8 
<http://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/hkimr201007.12c.pdf? noframes=1>   
26 ibid  
27 “However, the analysis of the impact of liquidity standards is considered to present specific challenges. Under 
the Proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2009, banks will be 
required to meet two new liquidity requirements – a short term requirement called the Liquidity Coverage 
Ration (LCR) and a long term requirement called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The Proposal focuses 
mainly on the NSFR – which is considered to be the more relevant constraint to macro economic effects on a 
longer term basis.” See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term 
Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements 
Publications August 2010 at page 7 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>   
28 See particularly R Cifuentes, G Ferrucci and HS Shin, “Liquidity Risk and Contagion” (2005) Journal of the 
European Economic Association Volume 3 at pages 556-566  http://www.bri.org/bcbs/events/rtf04shin.pdf  
the following effects which are generated by higher capital and liquidity standards, namely: 29 
 
- Making the financial system more resilient and:  
- Reducing the amplitude of the business cycles within the financial system.  
 
The association between systemic risks and liquidity risks and the rather apparent lack of 
due recognition accorded to liquidity risks under Basel II, constituted other reasons for the 
growing criticism of Basel II. 
 
Liquidity Risk  
 
The definition of liquidity, as provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), is “the 
ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses. The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, 
both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.” 30 
 
In their report on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding 
Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the recent financial 
crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating market conditions, was to a 
large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.” 31 This has resulted in an “increasingly important 
role for liquidity provided by central banks in the funding of bank balance sheets.” 32 Furthermore, 
the FSF highlighted the urgency of both authorities, namely, supervisors (in their monitoring of 
liquidity risks at banks) and central banks (in their design and implementation of market operations) 
collaborating in order to “ restore the functioning of inter bank lending markets.” 33 
 
As identified in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review, “the specific knowledge that banks 
possess about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.” 34 The connection 
between liquidity and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates 
on possible consequences resulting from a bank’s failure, namely: 35 The “destruction” of 
such specific knowledge which banks have about their borrowers and the reduction of “the 
common pool of liquidity.” 36 Such reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also 
trigger the failure of other banks – with the result that i) the value of such illiquid bank 
assets diminishes and ii) further problems within the banking systems are aggravated. 37 
 
“Endogenous risks” could also be generated depending on the type of information which the bank 
 
29 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact 
of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications 
August 2010 at page 5 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>  
30 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Sept 2008 at 
page 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>   
31
Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring 
and Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24 
32 ibid   
33 „In order to counter the transfer of funding liquidity risk by systemically important financial 
institutions to the public sector“ ;ibid  
34 “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009   
 http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?  
a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at page 137 
35 ibid  
36 ibid  
37 ibid  
possesses about their borrowers and how the dissipation of such information to the public, 
if it has the potential to trigger a bank run, can be prevented. 
 
According Greater Attention to Liquidity Risks 
 
In February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper titled 
“Liquidity Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges”, a paper which highlighted the 
fact that many banks had ignored the application of a number of basic principles of liquidity 
risk management during periods of abundant liquidity. 38  
An extensive review of its 2000 “Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking 
Organisations” was also carried out by the Basel Committee as a means of addressing 
matters and issues arising from the financial markets and lessons from the Financial Crises. 39 
 
In order to consolidate on the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision of September 2008, which should lead to improved management and supervision 
of liquidity risks of individual banks, supervisory bodies will be required “to develop tools and 
policies to address the pro cyclical behaviour of liquidity at the aggregate level”. 40 
 
In responding to the apparent gaps which exist with Basel II – as revealed by the recent 
crises, proposals which are aimed at imposing penalties for the occurrence of maturity 
mismatches 41 have been put forward. 42 The degree of disparity which exists between the 
maturity of assets and liabilities is crucial to determining the state of a company’s liquidity. 
Such penalties aimed at deterring the occurrence of maturity mismatches could include 
“higher capital requirements for banks which finance their assets with overnight borrowing 
from the money markets than banks which finance similar assets with term deposits.” 43 
 
The inability of bank capital, on its own, to address funding and liquidity problems has been 
acknowledged by many academics. As a result, further proposals, in addition to the above 
mentioned amendment to Basel II, have been put forward. These include the coupling of the 
existing regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms. 44 Such 
proposals are aimed at “giving banks the right incentives ex ante and at improving the resilience of 
the financial system to shocks ex post. 45 Furthermore, the ECB’s Financial Stability Review also 
highlights proposals which are aimed at supplementing Basel II regulation through the 
 
38 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Sept 
2008 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>  
39 ibid  
40 “The FSF proposes that the BCBS and CGFS develop a joint research effort to address funding and 
liquidity risk, starting in 2009. A key component of this research agenda is to define robust measures of 
funding and liquidity risk, which could assist assessments of liquidity risk by the private sector. Stress 
tests to gauge the probability and magnitude of a liquidity crisis in different market environments will be 
considered in this light.” For further information on this, see Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and Funding Liquidity Risk”  
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24   
41 A situation which could occur where an undertaking possesses more short term liabilities than short term 
asset. It could also occur where more assets are held (than liabilities) for medium and long term obligations.  
42 See “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 
2009 at page 148 and particularly Brunnermeier et al whose proposal includes the requirement of greater 
capital, “not only against the risk of assets, but also against the risk of funding such assets.”   
43 Ibid at 148  
44 Brunnermeier et al, Kashyap et al, and Perrotti and Suarez are all of the opinion that even though   
liquidity assistance to help banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is commendable, it would generate 
minimal benefits where such banks are not provided with the right incentives to reduce the probability of 
such shocks in the first place. For further information on this, see “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected 
Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review December 2009 at page 149 
45 ibid 
establishment of a mandatory liquidity insurance arrangement - whereby each bank has to 
pay the supervisor a liquidity charge. 46 
 
Even though the Basel Committee states (in its Consultative Document) that its Counter 
Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal is not a Pillar 2 approach “since it does not relate to the 
supervisor review of individual banks”  47, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) highlights the fact that “whilst forward looking systems of capital buffers for banks 
should be designed within the boundaries of the existing framework and that identified 
mechanisms could be employed alternatively under Pillar One, that its implementation under 
Pillar Two is still considered to be the most sensible option at the time.” 48 
 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors classifies Pillar 2 capital buffers into two 
components – the first being aimed at “building sufficient additional resources (above regulatory 
minimum) whilst the second is aimed at “covering losses arising from extreme events.” 49 Whilst 
the CEBS is also of the opinion that rating agencies appear to prefer Pillar One solutions (which 
are considered to be more transparent and less prone to national discretions), it also draws 
attention to the fact that Pillar 2 would allow for quicker responses and may be used for testing 
tools (which will be subsequently improved and possibly implemented under Pillar One). 50 
 
 
 
Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II 
 
Basel III 
 
The more refined and consolidated Basel II framework - along with “macro prudential 
overlay” [the objective of this “macro prudential overlay” comprising i) the redress of 
stability over time (that is, to address pro cyclicality), and ii) the redress of stability at each 
point in time (system-wide approach],  51 is referred to as Basel III. 52 Means through 
which “stability over time (pro cyclicality)” could be achieved include: 53 
 
- Through counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning  
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers.”  
 
According to a report, 54 the two principal solutions which have been endorsed by the Turner Review 
and the DeLarosiere Report, and which are considered to have the potential to reduce pro cyclical 
effects 55 induced by the CRD and Basel II, include: 1) The requirement that banks “hold bigger 
46 ibid  
47 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer 
Proposal“ July 2010  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 2.   
48 Committee of European Banking Supervisors “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 
2009 at pages 1 and 2 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-
position-paper-on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx> 
 
49 ibid at page 3  
50 ibid at page 4; On this basis, members of the CEBS conclude that “any counter cyclical adjustments 
should be calibrated to individual banks’ portfolios and based on risk sensitive concepts.” See ibid.  
51 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International 
Settlements Publications, page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>  
52 ibid  
53 ibid; Means whereby stability at each point in time (system-wide approach) could be achieved include through 
“systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions; the identification of inter linkages 
and common exposures among all financial institutions; and the systemic oversight of OTC derivatives.” ibid.   
54 The Turner Review :Key Elements of the Turner Review (page 2 of 4) <http://www.dlapiper.com>  
55 Exacerbated strains on bank capital is the term used to denote pro cyclicality ; see ibid  
International Accounting Standards are also considered to have had a pro-cyclical impact. It is stated that “in  
reserves during good times - hence limiting credit and risk expansion in good times and 
storing up capital to be used during bad times” (2) “Increasing risk-weighting on a range of 
assets because this also restricts balance sheet expansion”. 
 
 
Another proposal put forward as an optimal means of rectifying Basel II's pro cyclical effects – 
as illustrated through the “amplification of business cycle fluctuations”, involves the utilisation 
of a “business cycle multiplier of the Basel II capital requirements that is increasing in the rate 
of growth of the GDP”. Under such a scheme, it is argued, riskier “banks would face higher 
capital requirements without regulation exacerbating credit bubbles and crunches.” 56 
 
Other mechanisms provided under the CRD as means of mitigating pro cyclicality within 
the capital requirements framework include: 57 
 
The use of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates, PD estimates being based on long data 
series, technical adjustments made to the risk weight function, stress testing requirements and Pillar 2 
supervisory review process. It is acknowledged, however, that more measures may be required to 
mitigate the pro cyclical effects of the capital requirements framework. Options provided include those 
aimed at reducing its cyclical risk sensitivity, measures which enhance its risk capture, and the 
intentional introduction of counter-cyclical buffers (comprising capital and/or provisions). 
 
A counter cyclical capital charge, it is contended, 58 “would require financial institutions to hold 
more capital during buoyant periods whilst lowering the regulatory capital levels during periods of 
stress.” Other capital conservation measures include “actions aimed at limiting excessive dividend 
payments, share buy backs and compensation paid out by financial institutions. Through a 
retention of earnings during buoyant periods, a bank is able to conserve excess capital which can 
be used to absorb asset write offs during less buoyant periods and periods of financial stress.” 59 
 
The introduction of forward looking provisions has been supported by various sources and bodies. 
60 As well as illustrating how dynamic provisions can contribute towards mitigating pro cyclical 
effects, a preference for such provisions (in comparison to prudential reserves), has also been 
 
particular moving to marking to market accounting, rather than the more traditional marking to maturity, 
exacerbated volatility in the accounts of banks – with valuation becoming practically impossible for some 
securities as the market in them disappeared.”; ibid  
56 R Repullo, J Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte, “How to Mitigate the Pro cyclical Effects of Capital 
Adequacy Rules” <http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5ff0e4ba595.0.html>  
57 See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration 
policies http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf   
Page 46 of 47  
58 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
page 17; The methodology of the proposed “Too-Connected-to-Fail Capital Charge” highlighted by Jorg Chan Lau in 
his paper, comprises three important features . “First, it builds upon an intuitive principle: the capital charge must be 
proportional to the incremental contribution to societal losses (or risk) due to the failure of the institution. Second, by 
relating the concept of incremental contribution to systemic risk to concepts such as Value-at-Risk and Expected 
Shortfall, the TCTF capital charge is aligned with the spirit of Basel II. This alignment will facilitate its adoption and 
implementation by supervisory agencies and systemic risk regulators. Third, the measurement of the incremental 
contribution can be accomplished using a simple toolkit of models such as CoRisk analysis, network analysis, and 
portfolio credit risk models.” See J Chan Lau, „Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-to-Fail Institutions: A 
Practical Proposal”  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1566443 and  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1098.pdf at page 21   
59 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International 
Settlements Publications, page 17  
60 Bodies such as ECOFIN. See particularly, M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, 
Functioning, and Prudential Treatment”  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 
and  http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 6  
highlighted. 61 Burroni et al share the opinion that since provisions directly affect reported 
profits, they are more fully consistent with the idea of an expected loss model 62 (than is 
the case with prudential reserves). 63 
 
The benefits of provisions, and particularly forward looking provisions, will be considered 
in greater detail under the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
 
Principles Governing the Operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical 
Capital Buffer Proposal  
 
In opting for the establishment of principles which would serve as guidance for the operation of its 
counter cyclical capital buffer proposal, the Basel Committee made provision for possible problems 
which could arise if a hard rules – based approach were to be adopted. 64 Such problems, in the 
Basel Committee’s opinion, include the requirement of a very high degree of confidence (“that the 
variables used to calculate the buffer requirement would always correctly perform as intended and 
would not send out false signals”). 65 Despite allowing for a certain degree of flexibility – through 
such a principles and judgemental based approach, the Committee acknowledges the importance 
of establishing a “clear set of principles” which would not only “promote sound decision making in 
the setting of the counter cyclical buffer” 66 but the need to restrict the scope of judgement allowed 
(through the establishment of such clear set of principles). Furthermore, it highlights the 
importance of “proper communication” (where exercising such judgemental based decisions) as 
constituting an integral aspect of the proposal. 67 
 
Whilst the principles generally serve as guidance in the use of judgement within the framework, 
Principle One specifically provides that buffer decisions are to be guided by “the objectives to be 
achieved by the buffer – namely the protection of the banking system against potential future 
losses when excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide risk.” 68 
 
Principle Five highlights the importance of alternative tools such as “loan-to-value limits, interest 
rate qualification tests or sectoral capital buffers which may be deployed in situations where excess 
credit growth is concentrated in specific sectors but aggregate credit growth is judged not to be 
 
61 See ibid at page 23  
62 “Regulatory capital”, it is argued, “should address “unexpected losses”- such losses being defined as 
“losses that are large but infrequent” . On the other hand, “loan loss reserves should address 
“expected losses”. See L Laeven and G Majnoni, “ Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdown: 
Too Much Too Late?” (2003) Journal of Financial Intermediation Volume 12 at page 195   
63 M Burroni et al, “Dynamic Provisioning: Rationale, Functioning, and Prudential Treatment”   
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531323 and  
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/QF_57/QEF_57.pdf at page 23  
64 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer 
Proposal“ July 2010  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7  
65 ibid  
66 ibid  
67 ibid   
68 “The counter cyclical capital buffer is meant to provide the banking system with an additional buffer of capital to 
protect it against potential future losses, when excess credit growth in the financial system as a whole is associated with 
an increase in system-wide risk. The capital buffer can then be released when the credit cycle turns so that the released 
capital can be used to help absorb losses and reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by regulatory 
capital requirements. A side benefit of operating the buffer in this fashion is that it may lean against the build-up of 
excess credit in the first place. As such, the buffer is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage economic cycles 
or asset prices. Where appropriate, those may be best addressed through fiscal, monetary and other public policy 
actions. It is important that buffer decisions be taken after an assessment of as much of the relevant prevailing 
macroeconomic, financial and supervisory information as possible, bearing in mind that the operation of the buffer may 
have implications for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. “ see ibid 
 
excessive or accompanied by increased system-wide risk. “ 
 
Such principles governing the operation of the Basel Committee’s Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer 
Proposal can be contrasted with the CEBS’ view which (in line with EFC and G20 decisions), 
underlies the need for counter cyclical approaches that are based on automatic rules. The need for 
rules which would serve as a form of “automatic stabilisers” is attributed to the following factors: 69 
 
- The importance of ensuring that deterrents exist to “overcome industry or political resistance to 
increase buffers during periods of economic booms and to provide a level playing field”  
- The need for transparency and “clearly announced ex-ante in order to ensure that 
market participants are aware that banks build up buffers during periods of 
economic booms and run them down during recessive periods.  
- CEBS’ acknowledgment that discretion is already envisaged under Pillar Two – 
hence the need for the existence of some rules  
 
 
 
Financial Stability Forum Recommendations Aimed at Mitigating Pro cyclicality  
 
In its report 70 on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System”, the Financial 
Stability Forum’s recommendations to mitigate mechanisms that amplify pro cyclicality was 
extended to three areas: 71 
i) bank capital framework, ii) bank loan loss provisions as well as iii) leverage and 
valuation issues. 
 
A summary of the recommendations relating to capital, as provided in the Report of the 
Financial Stability Forum is as follows: 72 
 
 That the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should strengthen the 
regulatory capital framework so that the quality and level of capital in the banking 
system increase during strong economic conditions and can be drawn down during 
periods of economic and financial stress; 
 That the BCBS should revise the market risk framework of Basel II to reduce the 
reliance on cyclical VAR-based capital estimates; 
 The BCBS should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, 
non-risk based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking 
system and put a floor under the Basel II framework; 
 Supervisors should use the Basel Committee's enhanced stress testing practices 
as a critical part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process to validate the adequacy 
of banks’ capital buffers above the minimum regulatory capital requirement; 

 That the BCBS should monitor the impact of the Basel II framework and make appropriate 
 
69 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” 
July 2009 at pages 3 and 4 <http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-
778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>  
70 “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial 
System” http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf  
 
71 Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitisation issues and remuneration policies 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf page 46 of 47   
72 See “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System” at 
pages 2 and 3 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf  
adjustments to dampen excessive cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements; 
 
 That the BCBS carry out regular assessments of the risk coverage of the capital 
framework in relation to financial developments and banks’ evolving risk profiles 
and make timely enhancements. 
 
 
F. Conclusion  
 
In its attempt to adopt “a building block approach” which would organise the work on pro 
cyclicality – the aim of this approach being “the alignment of development of tools to 
address pro cyclicality according to a specific set of objectives”, four identified objectives 
set out by the Basel Committee in its December 2009 Consultative Document 
“Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector”, are as follows: 73 
 
- To dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement;  
- To promote more forward looking provisions;  
- To conserve capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector 
that can be used during periods of stress; and  
- To achieve the broader macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector 
from periods of excess credit growth.”  
 
 In accordance with the CEBS’ observations, counter cyclical mechanisms should be i) bank 
 
 specific, (ii) based on risk sensitive concepts - should also be compatible with the incentive 
 
 structure presented by Basel II (as well as Basel III), and (iii) should not be excessively burdensome 
 
 in terms of data needs and computational efforts. 74 
 
 Whilst efforts taken by the Committee appear to have focussed on capital – as evidenced by its 
 
 Consultative Document on Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal, more forward looking 
 
 provisions – as well as provisions which at are aimed at addressing losses and unforeseen problems  
 
 attributed to “maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long term loans”, would be greatly 
 
 welcomed. 
 
 Hannoun highlights the advantages which a forward looking provisioning model offers over that of  
 
 an “incurred loss” provisioning model. In his opinion, a forward looking provisioning model 
 
 encourages banks to set aside provisions in a forward looking fashion based on expected losses – as 
 
 opposed to the more backward looking provisions based on incurred losses. 75 Furthermore, he adds 
 
 that “ a forward looking approach not only captures actual losses more transparently, but is also less 
 
 pro cyclical than the incurred loss provisioning model which is presently being used.” 76 
 
 Further, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has acknowledged that tools 
 
 which could be implemented as measures for mitigating cyclicality, exist beyond those measures  
 
 proposed by the Basel Committee. As a result, it has taken up initiatives in relation to measures  
 
    
 
 73 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „ Consultative Document: Counter cyclical Capital Buffer Proposal“  
  
 
  July 2010  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1 
 
74 Bank specificity would ensure that counter cyclical tools are “tailored to the peculiarities of each bank’s  
  
 
  portfolios”, risk sensitive based concepts would mitigate “perverse incentives – as well as opportunities for arbitrage”. 
 
  See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 2009 at 
 
  page 4 
 
 75 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications, 
 
 page 17 
 
 76 ibid    
 
such as dynamic provisioning and supplementary measures which include leverage ratios. 77 
 
The proposed two new liquidity requirements, namely, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), respectively serve the purposes of “ensuring that 
banks have adequate funding liquidity to survive one month of difficult funding conditions 
(the LCR), and to address the mismatches between the maturity of a bank’s assets and 
that of its liabilities (the NSFR).”  78 Whilst such liquidity requirements would help to 
address the critical issues arising as a result of maturity mismatches, the implementation 
of counter cyclical capital buffers – as well as these new liquidity requirements (LCR and 
NSFR) would be bolstered by introducing more forward looking provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 
2009 at page 2 http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-
on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx 
  
78 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of 
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications August 2010 
at page 7 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>  
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